Open letter to President Obama
Mailed this morning:
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Mr. President:
Good day. I write to you on the issue of U.S.C. Title 10 § 654, the governing statute regarding the
separation of military members for homosexual conduct and UCMJ Article 125, the provision
prohibiting “unnatural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex”. During the
campaign last year and through the course of your young administration since, you have spoken of your
opposition to the first law, typically and from this point forward referred to as “don't ask, don't tell”
(DADT). Whereas the UCMJ article in question predates DADT and in fact was indirectly referenced
as justification for continuing restrictions on homosexual activity while passing the 1993 law, it should
be addressed as part of the larger question with regards to privacy rights for military members,
especially in light of the implications of the finding in Lawrence v. Texas (2003).
The prohibition on homosexual conduct in the military was incorporated at a time when anti-sodomy
laws were prevalent through the United States. Since then, much has changed in the political landscape
regarding not only the acceptance of people's right to live as they wish, but also our understanding of
what is encompassed in Constitutionally-protected privacy. As Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority
opinion for Lawrence, “liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct
their private lives in matters pertaining to sex... [t]he State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without the intervention of the
government.” Prior to Lawrence, Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) was the established precedent, and
therefore DADT was consistent with the Court's opinion on whether or not there existed a right to
privacy in the sexual affairs of consenting adults. In Lawrence, however, the Court overruled Bowers
and stated that such a right to privacy exists. Indeed, Justice Kennedy also wrote that “[t]he Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual.”
It has been argued that the military is a special case with unique circumstances and thus that the
findings in Lawrence do not apply to it. In fact, the government argued just that in United States v.
Marcum (2004) when upon appeal, the Air Force Criminal Court of Appeals considered whether or not,
in light of the then-recent Lawrence ruling, Article 125 was unconstitutional on its face. The
government argued that Lawrence only applied to civilian conduct and was inapplicable to the military,
despite the fact that no such stipulation was made in the majority opinion. However, this was not the
finding of the court:
“Constitutional rights identified by the Supreme Court generally apply to members of the military
unless by text or scope they are plainly inapplicable. Therefore, we consider the application of
Lawrence to Appellant’s conduct. However, we conclude that its application must be addressed in
context and not through a facial challenge to Article 125. This view is consistent with the principle that
facial challenges to criminal statutes are “best when infrequent” and are “especially to be discouraged.”
Sabri v. United States, ___ U.S. __, __, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1948 (2004). In the military setting, as this
case demonstrates, an understanding of military culture and mission cautions against sweeping
constitutional pronouncements that may not account for the nuance of military life. This conclusion is
also supported by this Court’s general practice of addressing constitutional questions on an as applied
basis where national security and constitutional rights are both paramount interests. Further, because
Article 125 addresses both forcible and non-forcible sodomy, a facial challenge reaches too far.
Clearly, the Lawrence analysis is not at issue with respect to forcible sodomy.”
The court was unwilling to invalidate Article 125 in this case because special circumstances existed in
the case which made the member's activity contrary to good order and discipline: namely, that he was
engaged in a sexual relationship with a subordinate. Also, the court determined that the provisions
regarding forcible sodomy did not fall under the scope of the Lawrence ruling and thus that Article 125
was not, on its face, unconstitutional. However, other provisions within the UCMJ already address the
two uniquely military issues at hand. Article 120 deals with the issue of rape and sexual assault, and
Article 134-23 deals with the issue of fraternization. Clearly, from a chain of command stand-point,
engaging in sexual activities with a subordinate of the opposite sex would also have an adverse effect
on morale and discipline. A specific prohibition on sodomy with subordinates is superfluous and
regardless, it is not addressed in Article 125. It is a blanket prohibition on all sodomy. The portions of
Article 125 regarding forced sodomy are redundant with relation to Article 120 and are clearly a post
hoc rationalization to regulate the private sexual activities of military members with only a vague claim
of “good order and discipline” to justify it.
In truth, the findings outlined in DADT could just as easily be applied to any minority group with
whom someone could be uncomfortable. A devout Christian may not be comfortable serving next to an
atheist or a Muslim, but that Christian has to move beyond that discomfort just as much as the atheist or
Muslim would have to move beyond the discomfort of serving next to a devout Christian. Whereas we
live in a pluralistic society and have specific prohibitions outlined in the Constitution and in U.S. law
against racial and religious discrimination, the military has to accommodate the minorities as well as
members for whom the presence of these minorities is disconcerting, just like any other government
agency. Aside from religious sensibilities of the majority, there is no case to be made as to why the
presence of a homosexual would be bad for unit cohesion. We do not accommodate racists who does
not regard a black man as his equal or misogynists who will not take orders from a woman. No reason
exists to accommodate homophobes who cannot coexist with someone who does not love the same way
they do.
The Congress's claim of exclusive authority in setting standards for admission is specious at best. The
Constitution does invest the Congress with the authority to raise armies and provide navies per section
8 of Article I of the Constitution, but they are still subject to other requirements laid out in the
Constitution with regards to civil rights and civil liberties, and they are still subject to judicial review.
Significant precedent exists stating that American citizens do not check their civil liberties at the door
when they enter the military, except to the extent that a valid mission need to do so exists. Justice
Ginsburg, in her written concurrence with the majority ruling in Weiss v. United States (1994) stated,
“men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional safeguards and judicial protection
behind when they enter military service.” Only when the application of those civil liberties would be
harmful to the mission may they be curtailed, and then only to the extent necessary. Advocates of
restricting military members' sexual activities have never made a case where private, consensual sexual
activities between two clear-headed adults have any mission impact, save for in a war zone, where all
sexual activities are prohibited anyway. The United States Army Court of Appeals recognized this in
United States v. Bullock (2004) when, using Lawrence as precedent, they ruled that an act of sodomy as
defined by Article 125 did not demonstrate any “additional factors relevant solely in the military
environment that affect the nature and reach of the Lawrence liberty interest.” They thus overturned
his conviction for an act of sodomy with a civilian woman, since prosecuting him for that was a
violation of his civil liberties.
There is no evidence that a person's private sexual activities has any impact on mission readiness or
unit cohesion. If anything, it is the military's incessant snooping in our private affairs which is
destructive to morale. Our desire to keep our private lives private and out of the all-seeing military's
eye does not make us undisciplined or immoral. It simply makes us American.
The rationales for continuing to defend these restrictions in court do not carry any Constitutional
validity. Rather than feeling bound to uphold a bad law, would it not be possible to file suit challenging
the Constitutionality of the law yourselves? Its legal grounding seems dubious, especially in light of
the Lawrence ruling and subsequent findings by military courts that it does apply to military members.
DADT seems like it's just waiting to be knocked down by somebody big enough.
One final point of contention: the “Rule of Construction” in U.S.C. Title 10 § 654 paragraph (e)
explicitly gives the Secretary of Defense broad authority to determine through regulation whether or
not a member should be separated on account of homosexual conduct. To wit:
“(e) Rule of Construction.— Nothing in subsection (b) shall be construed to require that a member of
the armed forces be processed for separation from the armed forces when a determination is made in
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense that—
(1) the member engaged in conduct or made statements for the purpose of avoiding or terminating
military service; and
(2) separation of the member would not be in the best interest of the armed forces.”
It strikes me that if challenging DADT in the courts is too drastic, the SECDEF could simply determine
it to be in the best interest of the armed forces to suspend all separations stemming from homosexual
conduct until such time as the Congress has fully reviewed the policy and passed legislation changing
or even outright repealing the law. If you asked Secretary Gates to make such a finding, would he not
do as the Commander in Chief asked? You have the authority under the very statute you say you are
bound to uphold to suspend it. Why have you not done so?
I hope that this letter will find you well. As a heterosexual who has had to watch homosexual friends
struggle with their hidden identities over the years, it pains me to see them still having to wait for
action which was promised to them and which could, in all reality, be carried out today. I hope you
will give this full consideration.
Thank you for your time.


